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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to observe the association 
between inter-part}7 competition and the campaign strategies employed 
by various Congressional candidates. The hypothesis is that candidates 
in competitive districts conduct more "rational" campaign strategies 
than candidates from noncompetitive districts. A campaign strategy 
is considered "rational" if the candidate: makes group appeals,
emphasizes policy and constituency issues rather than ideological 
and personal ones; concentrates his time and efforts in areas of 
strength rather than weakness; engages in as much personal contact 
as possible; employs a simple, recognizable campaign theme; emphasizes 
his party affiliation if from the majority party and emphasizes his 
personal characteristics if from the minority party; and attempts 
to increase the voter turnout if a nonincumbent.
The campaigns in four Congressional districts in Virginia 
were observed during the 1972 election campaign. The data for the 
study came from direct interviews with the eight candidates in the 
four races. An index of inter-party competition was prepared and 
the candidate's responses were related to the amount of party 
competition in each district.
The results of the investigation confirmed the hypothesis.
In this setting, candidates from competitive districts did employ 
more "rational" campaign strategies than candidates from noncompetitive 
districts.
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY: THE IMPACT
INTER-PARTY COMPETITION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study Is concerned with the relationship between the 
amount of competition in campaigns and various features of campaign 
strategy. Beginning with Key, political scientists have argued that 
parties facing competition are likely to have the most centralized 
control of nominations, and the greatest cohesion in state legisla­
tures and in gubernatorial-legislative relations. And, as a result, 
they are likely to be the most effective and responsive governing 
agencies,^  By now it is a common assumption among students of 
American politics that political leaders in a competitive two-party
system are more responsive to the popular will ". . . not so much out
2
of principle as out of fear of retribution at the polls.1' To the 
extent that this assumption is correct, competitive elections are a 
basic feature of democracy, if that word is interpreted to mean 
popular control of political decision making.
One reason that competitive elections are thought to be such 
a basic aspect of popular control is that they produce what ma}? be
■^V. 0. Key, Southern Politics (New York: Vintage Books,
1949), ch. 14; V. 0. Key, American State Politics: An Introduction
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 201; Robert Golembiewski,
"A Taxonomic Approach-to State Political Party Strength," Western 
Political Quarterly, XL (1958), 494-513.
2
Duane Lockhard, New England State Politics (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 327.
2
called "rational" campaigns; that is, campaigns which educate the 
public, which illuminate public issues and provide realistic policy 
alternatives, and which provide an opportunity for the indication of 
majority preference. Whether or not competitive campaigns actually 
promote rational strategies, however, is a question not carefully 
investigated in the literature of the field to this time. The purpos 
of this paper is preliminary inquiry which may fill in that gap some­
what .
This paper examines the general idea that the amount of inter 
party competition affects key decisions made by candidates concerning 
their campaign strategies. Its thesis is that candidates in 
competitive campaigns are likely to employ campaign strategies that 
may be considered "rational," while candidates in noncompetitive 
races do not. They will be called "rational" campaign strategies 
here if they are strategies aimed at acquiring as many votes as 
possible.
The acquisition of as many votes as possible is assumed here 
to be the major objective of campaigns. A simple majority of the 
vote is enough to win an election, of course; indeed, in many races 
involving more than two candidates, less than a majority will be 
sufficient. Nonetheless, most candidates probably seek to obtain 
as many votes as possible, and not merely a majority. There are many 
reasons for this. One, the most obvious, perhaps, is that candidates 
have no way of judging their campaigning productivity accurately, so 
as to spend just enough energy, money, and other resources to produce 
a majority. Accordingly, the temptation is to spend as much as is
4available, rather than an amount designed to produce a carefully gauged 
winning vote. In some cases, a candidate's ambition is to seek higher 
office beyond the present election, and, hence, his aim is not merely 
to win, but also to demonstrate an overwhelming vote-getting ability.
In others, a candidate's hope may be to win by so large a margin as 
to reduce the chances of opposition at some future election. In all 
of these cases, candidates who hope to win try to do so by winning as 
many votes as possible, and not just a majority.
All candidates, however, do not actually hope to win. Some 
who have no hope of winning the election may run for entirely different 
purposes, such as gaining a reputation, or promoting some cherished 
cause. Even in such cases, however, it may be assumed that the 
candidate's objective is to win as many votes as possible. If a 
candidate's purpose in running for office is to increase his private 
business, the more votes he gets (even though losing), the greater the 
benefit to his business, one may assume. If the purpose is to give 
notoriety to some unpopular or little-known cause, the same is true.
In virtually all cases, then, it is reasonable to assume that the 
single objective of all electoral campaigns is to win as many votes 
as possible.
An action or a decision is considered rational ", . . to the
3
extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement." 
Thus, if the goal of a campaign is considered to be that of winning
3
Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Ecnomics, 
and Welfare (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 38.
as many votes as possible, then what could be called a "rational 
campaign strategy" is one that has been determined by the experience 
of other candidates to be most effective in winning votes. The 
hypothesis of this paper is that candidates in competitive districts 
are more inclined to employ rational campaign strategies than are 
candidates in noncompetitive districts in that they:
1. make appeals to major groups in the electorate;
2. emphasize policy and constituency issues rather than
ideological and personal ones;
3. concentrate their time and efforts in areas of
strength rather than weakness;
4. engage in more personal contact;
5. employ a simple, recognizable theme;
6. emphasize their party affiliation if they are from 
the majority party and emphasize their personal characteristics if 
they are from the minority party; and
nonincumbent
7. make a greater effort to increase the turnout if a 
4
4
These strategic points are taken from various books that 
have been written on the subject of campaign strategy and tactics; 
especially see, Lewis Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign 
Strategies and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent 
Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Ilal 1, Inc., 1966); John Kessel, "A Game Theory Analysis 
of Campaign Strategy," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings 
and Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc
1966); John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York: Random House,
1968); Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971); David Leuthold,
Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1968); Conrad Joyner, chapter in Practical Politics in the United
6The argument, is that candidates in competitive districts are forced 
to utilize these proven effective strategies; whereas in noncompeti­
tive districts, because of the certainty of the outcome, both the 
winning and losing candidates can afford to waste resources in 
"nonrational" ways.
In order to pursue this research problem, it will be necessary . 
first of all to identify very clearly what the elements of a "rational" 
campaign strategy are. This will be the burden of Chapter II, which 
foil ows. Chapter III, in turn, will deal with methods of the study, 
describing the design of the research project, the method used for 
measuring inter-party competition, and the setting in which the 
field research was carried out. The results of the study are presented 
in Chapter IV, leading to the conclusion that competitive contests do 
indeed promote the use of rational campaign strategies. The final 
chapter contains a summary of the findings, and a discussion of their 
significance.
States, ed. by Cornelius Cotter (Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1969); Murray Levin, The Complete Politician (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962); Dan Nimmo, The Political 
Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ilal1, Inc.,
1970)'.
CHAPTER II
RATIONAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY: A DEFINITION
Politicians have long believed that their behavior daring
election campaigns could determine their success or failure on
election day.“* Numerous cases are cited in which candidates have
campaigned vigorously against heavy odds and managed to win; and,
also, cases in which overconfident candidates took the campaign
too lightly and were upset. Nixon is an example: he believes
that his performance during the 1960 campaign period cost him
the Presidency in 1960.^
There is evidence that campaigns actually have relatively
7
little effect on voting behavior. Political scientists have found
that the factor most consistently related to voting decisions is
the party identification of the voter, and also that most of the
8electorate decide on whom to support prior to the campaign. 
Nonetheless, campaigns may be seen to be an important part of the
^Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 1.
^Richard Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.,
1962), ch. 6.
7
Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfield, and William McPhee, 
Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 132-37.
g
Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 3.
7
8American political process:
The American political campaign is the means through which the 
public leaves its mark on the governmental process and through 
which a broad consensus is reached. It opens the way to the only 
truly accurate poll of the voters' political mood and desires. It 
requires the stewards of power to account for their activities and 
permits those who seek to replace them to challenge that accounting 
And campaigns, whatever the intent of the candidates, usually do 
exercise an educational i n f l u e n c e . ^
This chapter examines what others have written about the ele­
ments of campaign strategy, in an effort to devise a working definition 
of a "rational" campaign, a necessary basis from which to devise the 
theory which guides this study. It begins with the writer’s definition 
of a "rational campaign strategy" and then goes on to discuss each of 
the several aspects of campaign strategy which are thought to be 
associated with campaigns, and, hence, might be considered in the 
formulation of a definition of rational campaigning.
A . Definition of Rational 
C amp ai gn S t ra t e gv
As mentioned in Chapter I, a "rational campaign strategy" is 
one that has been determined by the experience of other candidates 
to be most effective in winning votes. By examining what has been 
written previously about campaign strategy, the writer has chosen 
seven elements of campaigning that appear to have been most effective 
in winning votes in the past. For purposes of this research, a 
campaign strategy will be considered rational if the candidate abides
9
American Institute for Political Communication, The New 
Methodology: A Study of Political Strategy and Tactics (Washington,
D. C.: American Institute for Political Communication, 1967),
Introduction.
9by the following rules:
1. Group appeals. The candidate must appeal to groups, 
rather than to undifferentiated masses of people.
2. Area concentration. The candidate must concentrate 
his time and efforts in areas of strength rather than weakness.
3. Issue emphasis. The candidate must stress policy and 
constituency issues rather than ideological and personal issues.
4. Personal contact. The candidate must engage in as 
much personal contact as possible.
5. Theme. The candidate must employ a simple, 
recognizable campaign theme.
6. Party-personality. The candidate must emphasize his 
party affiliation if from the majority party and emphasize his 
personal characteristics if from the minority party.
7. Voter turnout. The candidate, if a nonincumbent, must 
attempt to increase the voter turnout.
Each of these elements is considered in the following discussion.
B . Group Appeals
It is difficult to speak about campaigns in general because of 
the many variations that are likely to exist.^ However, there are 
certain features that appear to be common to most campaigns. One of 
these is that most candidates attempt to develop group support. One
Charles Jones, "A Suggested Scheme for Classifying 
Congressional Campaigns,11 Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring, 1962, 
pp. 126-32.
10
way of viewing the electorate is that it is composed of a large number 
of groups and associations. Therefore, candidates often attempt to 
build a coalition of supporting groups which would be sufficient to 
elect them.
Froman has written on the subject of campaign strategy and
tactics and states that . . one of the most important tasks
confronting candidates for public office is the gaining and main-
12taining of group support." The Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan has established that the voter's decision
is based in part on his attitude toward the various groups in the 
] 3electorate. These groups can be of many types: political, social,
economic, and so on. Studies have indicated that 10 per cent or more
of the members of a group may be affected by the decision of their
14
leadership to oppose or support a candidate. They have also shown 
that even if the leadership does not take a position, group members 
may be affected by the fact that one of the candidates is a member of 
the group, for example, when Catholics vote more strongly for a 
Catholic candidate than they would have voted for a non-Catholic
^John Kingdom, Candidates for Office (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 116.
12
Lewis Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings and 
Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966) .
13Angus Campbell, et a1., The American Voter (New York: 
vTohn Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), ch. 10.
"^David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 61.
11
candidate.^
If a candidate can acquire group support, he will have three
of the basic processes of group life working to his advantage.First,
groups serve as a means of communication: through discussions and
conversations, information concerning the candidate can be made
relevant to the concerns of group members. Second, groups provide
criteria for evaluating and interpreting information so that it is
likely that the group member will come to see the information in a
particular way. And third, groups act as mechanisms to enforce
conformity among their members. This conformity can be achieved
because the most effective pressure on people is that of group 
17pressure.
Also, it should be mentioned that groups can provide two of
the most important practical resources needed in a campaign: workers
and money. Despite this evidence that group support is beneficial
to candidates, a study by Kingdon of candidates for office in Wisconsin
indicated that nearly one-half of the candidates interviewed replied
18that they did not make group appeals. There is also evidence that 
candidates do not adhere to another of the elements of the rational 
campaign strategy--that of concentrating major efforts in areas of
15Campbell, et a1., The American Voter, pp. 314-21.
^Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," p. 4.
^  J . A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion (Baltimore: 
Penquin Books, 1968), p. 50.
18Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 116.
12
strength.
C . Area Concentration
One of the rules of campaigning is that the candidate should
19concentrate on areas in which he is thought to be strongest. As
Froman points out, it is much easier to get one's known supporters
to cast a favorable vote than it is to activate latent support or to
20
change the opposition. Attempting to change the opposition is
difficult because of peoples' predispositions which give rise to
selective exposure, perception, and retention. This selectivity
induces people to attend mostly to communications that reinforce
21
already existing beliefs. Thus, it is much easier for a candidate 
to communicate with people who are already predisposed to vote for 
him.
Campaigning in areas of party strength is also realistic
because of the fact that those people with party identification are
22more likely to vote than those without party affiliation. The 
evidence, then, indicates that the rational strategy is to campaign 
in areas of strength and not weakness. However, the Kingdon study
19Conrad Joyner, Chapter in Practical Politics in the 
United States, ed. by Cornelius Cotter (Boston, Massachusetts: 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 162.
20Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and 
Tactics," p . 7.
21Joseph Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New 
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), pp. 19-27.
22
Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," pp. 6-7.
13
once again indicates that many candidates do not follow this basic
strategic point: only one-third of the candidates answered that they
23
concentrated on areas where they thought they would do well.
D. I ssue Emphasis
What has been defined here as a "rational" campaign strategy 
includes the argument that certain types of issues should be stressed. 
Four issues can be identified for this purpose: policy, ideology,
constituency, and personal. Policy and constituency issues, it will 
be argued here, are associated with rational campaigning. Ideological 
and personal issues have not been considered effective in winning 
votes and, thus, are not associated with rational campaigning.
There has been some question whether voters actually divide 
on the basis of issues at all. Because voters are so ill-informed 
about questions of public policy, it is frequently argued that issues 
are of little consequence. One study of the voters' knowledge of 
issues during the 1.958 Congressional elections came to this conclu­
sion: not more than a "chemical trace" of evidence was found that
voters had any detailed information about the policy stands of the 
24
candidates. However, one of the basic works in this field has 
established that one of the elements that voters base their decision
23Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 119.
24Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence 
in Congress," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, 
ed. by Robert Peabody and Nelson Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company, 196 9), p. 47.
25
on is the various issues of the campaign. Also, a more recent
study has indicated that voters usually are concerned with a few
specific issues and that these can . . have a considerable impact
26on electoral choice.” In a particular campaign, a critical issue
may have an impact such as was apparently the case with the tax issue
27
in the 1962 Wisconsin gubernatorial race. In this study it will
be assumed that issues are an important ingredient of the voting 
decision.
Policy issues can be important in gaining support from 
opinion leaders such as newspaper editors and group leaders. These 
people usually support a candidate because of the candidate’s stand 
on various questions of public policy and they could hardly do this 
if the candidate did not make evident his views on issues that
kt t 28 concern public policy.
The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan has
established that most of the American electorate is not guided by
29ideology in its voting behavior. There is also evidence that even 
among the party workers, in this case precinct leaders, less than
25Campbell, e t a 1., Th e Ame r i can Vo ter, pp. 523-38.
26David Repass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," American 
Political Science Review, June, 1971.
27Kingdon, Candidates for Office, p. 115.
^Ibid . , p . 114 .
29Campbell, et al., The American Voter, ch. 10.
10 per cent are Ideologically oriented. A candidate, then, should
run a nonideological campaign, stressing substantive policy issues,
not ideological ones, thus seeking a broad base of support.
The Goldwater campaign of 1964 is generally considered a
good example of an ideological campaign. If one of the parties runs
a candidate from its outer wing, it tends to leave a vacuum in the
center of the political spectrum which can be filled by the opposing
party without losing any votes from its own side of the spectrum.
The result, as in 1964: M. . . logically and inexorably, is a
31landslide at the polls . . . "  for the opposition.
Much of a Congressman’s time is spent in helping his con­
stituents with their individual problems, constituent service. A
recent study indicated that 28 per cent of a member's time and nearly
3241 per cent of his staff's time is devoted to serving constituents. 
This is due in part to the increased impact of government on the daily 
lives of people who, therefore, are frequently forced to turn to their 
representative for assistance. For a Congressman ". . . becoming a
legislative expert in a less certain avenue to re-election than other
30Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral
Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), p. 303.
31Phillip Converse, Aage Clausen and Warren Miller, 
"Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964- Election," American
Political Science Review, June, 1965, p. 321.
32John S. Saloma, Congress and the New Politics (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), pp. 184-85.
16
more constituent-oriented activities." Therefore, a candidate should
emphasize during his campaign what he can do for his constituents
(constituency issues).
It is also argued that a rational candidate should not engage
in personal attacks (personal issues) on his opponent. One reason
, 34
is simply that it is usually not wise to publicize one s opponent.
There is evidence also that attacks of this sort may have the reverse
35of the desired effect.
In general, then, the rational campaign strategy would dictate
that candidates stress policy issues and issues of constituent
service and avoid ideological appeals and personal attacks. Here,
again, not all candidates have seen fit to follow this strategy.
However, a study by Huckshorn and Spencer indicated that candidates
in close contests tended to emphasize policy and constituency
3 6issues far more than those candidates who were sure losers.
E . Personal Contact
Another rule of good campaigning is that the candidate should 
meet as many people as possible. Personal contact by the candidate
33Charles Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It
(New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 58.
34Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," p. 16.
~^Ibid . , p . 18 .
3 6Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, The Politics of 
Defeat (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1971), p. 209.
17
makes a ". . . more lasting impression than any other form of solicita-
37tion." What politicians have long suspected is now being verified
by social scientists: the more personal the communication, the more
38
effective it is likely to be. Congressmen seeking reelection
have indicated that whatever else they do during a campaign they
39nearly always emphasize the personal appearance technique.
An appealing feature of this tactic is that it costs very 
little: in terms of cash outlay the candidate's time is a very
inexpensive resource. Also, it helps the candidate to create the 
image that he is a man of the people, willing to listen to the 
ordinary citizen. Thus, candidates are willing to shake hands 
extensively at shopping centers, go door-to-door, and do other 
physically demanding activities just for that element of personal 
contact. The Leuthold study of Congressional candidates in the 
San Francisco Bay area found that the candidates agreed that personal 
contact was the most successful means of influencing voters. However, 
there was a wide discrepancy among the candidates as to how much 
personal contact they actually engaged in during the course of their 
campaign. Candidates in competitive races campaigned among the 
electorate over twice as many days as those candidates who were in
Joyner, Practical Politics in the United States, p. 166.
38Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," p. 16.
39Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It, p. 429.
noncompetitive races.
F . Theme
The purpose of a campaign theme . . is to simplify complex
public issues into brief, clear, recognizable statements to the
41advantage of the candidate." A short and simple theme is important
because voters are not likely to be attuned to complicated political
42
messages and are more apt to remember a brief message. Also, if
the theme is to be used on campaign literature, billboards, and
other advertisements, the requirements of time and space make short
themes a necessity. In fact, one political scientist considers a
short concise theme to be more important than any particular issue
that may arise during a campaign. Nimmo states that modern
campaigns are fought not on the issues but on the themes and failure
43to have a theme can be very frustrating. Perhaps two of the best 
examples of campaign themes working to the advantage of the 
candidate occurred in the 1960 and 1968 Presidential campaigns.
John Kennedy's promise to "Get America Moving Again" and Hubert 
Humphrey's questioning of whether one could "Trust" his two opponents 
are credited with being assets to the respective candidate's
40Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy, pp. 103-07.
41Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 54.
42Joyner, Practical Politics in the United States, p. 166.
43Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, p. 55.
19
44campaign.
G • Party-Personality
One factor facing all candidates when determining their
strategies is whether or not their party is the majority party. The
Survey Research Center has established that part}? identification has
a very profound impact on electoral choice: that up to 75 per cent
45of the electorate simply vote their party loyalties at the polls.
It is also evident that the electorate, in part, makes its decision
on an evaluation of the personal attributes of the candidates
Therefore, ". . . the basic strategy for the majority is to emphasize
party appeals and play down personal traits . . . the candidate of the
L\. 7
minority, of course, stresses 'the man, not the party. r" Kessel,
by use of a game theory analysis of the 1960 presidential campaign,
indicated that Nixon from the minority party should have placed the
most emphasis on his own abilities and the least on his party. On
the other hand, John Kennedy's optimal strategy would have been to
devote the most attention to the Democratic Party and direct less
48attention to himself. The John Volpe campaign for Governor of
44Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and 
Tactics," p. 16; Theodore White, The Making of the President 1968 
(New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), pp. 418-19.
45Campbell, et al., The American Voter, pp. 136-42.
^Ibid . , p . 54 .
47Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, pp. 50-51.
A 8John Kessel, "A Game Theory Analysis of Campaign Strategy," in 
The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 293-94.
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Massachusetts in 1960 is a case of a candidate from a distinctly
minority party following this strategy and achieving success. The
49Volpe campaign theme was: "Vote the Man, Vote Volpe." This, then,
is a basic element of the rational campaign strategy.
H . Voter Turnout
Another tactic that is relevant to most campaigns is that 
when faced with an incumbent, the challenger should attempt to 
increase voter t u r n o u t . T h e  reason for this is that it is 
considered much easier to bring a new voter into the system than 
it is to get an old partisan to change sides. If the electorate 
is not changed from the previous election, it is likely that changing 
the result will be quite difficult. Those people who have not voted 
in the past are most likely not affiliated with any party and are 
frequently indifferent to politics and, therefore, more easily 
swayed by campaign appeals, if the candidate can motivate them to 
turnout. Schatt. schneider has pointed out that it has always been 
true that one of the best ways to win a fight is to widen the scope 
of the conflict and that ". . . the expansion of the political
52community has been one of the principal means of producing change."
49Murray Levin, The Complete Politician (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1962), p. 299.
50Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," p. 12.
~^Niramo, The Political Persuaders, p. 25.
52E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 99.
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Thus, the nonincumbent should attempt to widen the scope of the 
conflict by getting as many new voters to the polls as possible.
I . Summary
These, then, are the elements of the "rational" campaign 
strategy: candidates seek group support; concentrate their efforts
in areas of strength; emphasize policy and constituency issues and 
avoid ideological and personal ones; engage in as much personal 
contact as possible; employ a simple, recognizable campaign theme; 
emphasize their party affiliation if a member of the majority party 
and emphasize their personal characteristics if a member of the 
minority party; and if a nonincumbent, attempt to increase the voter
turnout. After this discussion of the elements of a rational
campaign strategy, the following chapter deals with the theory
and methodology of the study.
The main idea to be examined here is that electoral races 
in which inter-party competition is high promote the use of rational 
campaign strategies, as defined here. The following chapter will 
attempt to elaborate this theory somewhat, to devise an index of 
inter-party competition, and outline the methodology followed in 
the balance of the study.
CHAPTER III 
THE METHOD OF THE STUDY: MEASURING
INTER-PARTY COMPETITION
This chapter presents the method of the study beginning with 
a description of how the data are gathered and analyzed, followed by 
an explanation of how the index of inter-party competition was pre­
pared. The chapter concludes xvith a brief description of the 
setting, four Virginia Congressional districts that are observed.
A . The Study
The major source of data for the study comes from direct 
interviews with eight candidates in four Congressional districts in 
Virginia in the 1972 House elections. All of the candidates except 
one were interviewed in the six weeks immediately preceding the 
November 7 election. One candidate was not available until the 
middle of December. The interviews were conducted, for the most 
part, in the candidaters home or in his office, although two were 
conducted after rallies that were held in the respective candidate's 
behalf. All of the candidates were very accommodating; the inter­
views averaged about forty minutes in length. A copy of the interview 
schedule is in Appendix A and a listing of the candidates interviewed 
is in Appendix B. Also, to aid the analysis and the writer's under­
standing of the various campaigns, at least one member of each 
candidate's staff and one newspaper reporter from each district were
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questioned. These responses were not quantified and were used, for t 
most part, to assist the writer in determining campaign themes and th 
number of personal, appearances made by the various candidates. All 
the interviewing was done by the writer. Newspaper articles and 
campaign literature were both used as additional sources of infor­
mation .
The candidate responses were quantified and related to the 
variable of inter-party competition. The factor of incumbency 
(incumbent or nonincumbent) was also considered when it was evident 
that there was a significant relationship between it and inter­
party competition. This factor is often considered among the
most important in political campaigns with the contest taking
53place between the "ins" and the "outs." No tests of statistical
significance were used. The size of the sample was too small to
warrant generalization; the results are presented in percentages.
The decision to use simple percentage tables was made for the same
reasons as Kingdon stated in his study: large significant percentage
differences could occur in the tables, but because of the small size
of the sample would be considered statistically insignificant and,
54therefore, discarded.
David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 3.
54John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 160.
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B . An Index of Inter-Party 
Competition
Competition in politics may be described as a relationship 
among those who are competing, and in the two-party system that 
characterizes American politics, it is almost always the relationship 
between the two major parties. Inter-party competition, then, is 
the feature of American politics studied, for the most part, by 
those who wish to explore the meaning of competition in an American 
setting.
Inter-party competition has been studied fairly extensively
in the political science literature of the last decade. Of all the
variables studied in the analysis of state party politics, perhaps
the one receiving the most attention from political scientists has
been inter-party competition. One of the most comprehensive reviews
55of this literature has been done by Pfeiffer. His review indicates
that four types of inter-party competition measures have been used:
pendulum effect, percentage of elections won, percentage of the vote,
and the alternation in office by the parties. After careful analysis
of these types, Pfeiffer recommends the percentage of the vote as 
5 6being superior. He states that the simplest way to use the 
percentage of the vote is to compute the average margin of victory 
for the winning candidate. A version of this method is used by the
55David Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party 
Competition and Systemic Stability," American Political Science 
Review, LXI (June, 1967), 457-67.
~^ Ibid., p. 462.
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writer in determining the index of inter-party competition used in
this study. The index of inter-party competition used here is the
one suggested by David of the University of Virginia. ^  He argues
that the truest test of competitiveness is simply to compute the
runner-up’s percentage of one-half the total vote, because to win
the runner-up merely has to win one vote more than 50 per cent of 
5 8the total vote. This method results in a scale that has zero 
for its lower limit and approaches 100 as its upper limit; the closer 
to 100, the higher the level of competition. Thus, a party that 
received 45 per cent of the vote would rank at 90 on the scale 
because its percentage of one-half the total vote would be 90 per 
cent. For this study, the election results for the last ten years 
for the offices of Governor, United States Senator, and Congressman 
were combined to arrive at an index of inter-party competition for 
the four districts. The decision to use the results from only the 
last ten years (five Congressional, four Senatorial, and two 
Gubernatorial) was arrived at because of the fact that changes in 
Virginia politics have occurred in the recent past and it was felt 
that to consider additional results would distort the realism of 
the index. The results of the index are shown in Appendix B.
Paul David, "How Can an Index of Party Competition Best 
be Derived?,1' The Journal of Politics, XXXIV (May, 1972),
632-38.
CO
Ibid., p. 635.
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C . The Sotting
The setting for the study is four Congressional districts
in Virginia, two competitive and two noncompetitive. The four
districts include Tidewater, Virginia, parts of Northern Virginia,
and the Shenandoah Valley. Due to redistricting, all four had
changed considerably from the 1970 election. The First district
consists of the cities of Hampton and Newport News and several
59predominately rural counties in Tidewater. Of the electorate,
80 per cent live in metropolitan Hampton— Newport News. The Second 
district is totally urban, consisting of the cities of Norfolk 
and Virginia Beach. Both districts depend heavily on the military, 
especially the Navy, as shipbuilding and repairing serve as the 
economic base for the area. Both districts also have substantial 
black populations: 22 per cent in the First and 31 per cent in
the Second.
The Tenth district consists of much of the Virginia part 
of the Washington metropolitan area: the counties of Arlington,
Loudon, and northernmost Fairfax. The residents are predominantly 
white--only 6 per cent are black-— and have mostly middle and upper- 
middle incomes. Most depend either directly or indirectly on govern­
ment payrolls. At the conclusion of registration on October 7, 1972, 
the Tenth had more potential voters than any other district in the
59The following description of the four districts is taken 
from Micheal Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, The 
Almanac of American Politics (Boston, Massachusetts: Gambit,
1972), pp". 833-55.
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state, over 240,000.^
The Seventh district includes the Shenandoah Valley of 
Virginia and several counties east of the Blue Ridge Mountains.
It stretches from Virginia’s northernmost county, Frederick, south­
ward nearly to Richmond, encompassing twenty-one counties and four 
small cities. Nearly 70 per cent of the district's labor force 
are blue collar; much of the area is farmland with the economic 
base of the district consisting mainly of the production of 
livestock, poultry, and dairy products. Blacks comprise 9 per cent 
of the population; no other ethnic group has over 1 per cent.
D . Summary
With the theoretic basis, the methodology and setting now 
established, the next chapter deals with the results of the 
investigation. Do candidates from the more competitive districts 
tend to employ more rational campaign strategies than their counter­
parts in noncompetitive districts?
^The Richmond Times-Dispatch [ Richmond, Virginia ], 
October 20, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1.
CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION 
ON CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
This chapter presents the results of the investigation to 
determine if rational campaign strategy and party competition are 
related. A campaign was considered rational if the candidate:
1. makes group appeals;
2. concentrates his time and efforts in areas of strength 
rather than weakness;
3. emphasizes policy and constituency issues rather than 
ideological and personal ones;
4. engages in as much personal contact as possible;
5. employs a simple, recognizable campaign theme;
6. emphasizes his party affiliation if from the majority 
party and emphasizes his personal characteristics if from the minority 
party; and
7. attempts to increase the voter turnout if a non-
incumbent .
An index of inter-party competition was also prepared and is explained 
in Chapter III. Each of these seven elements of the rational campaign 
strategy are considered individually.
The writer interviewed eight candidates from four Congressional 
districts in Virginia. Of the districts, two were competitive and 
two were noncompetitive. The candidates’ responses, along with
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information acquired from campaign aides, were quantified and related 
to the factor of inter-party competition. The results, when 
possible, are shown in percentage tables. Various examples are also 
cited to help indicate the nature of the different campaign strategies 
employed.
A . Group Appeals
As mentioned in Chapter II, it is considered extremely 
important that candidates seek and acquire the support of groups. 
Therefore, candidates were asked, "In your campaigning, is there 
any group or groups of voters that you especially make an appeal 
to?M (See Appendix A.) Their replies suggest that the view that 
candidates seek a coalition of groups sufficient to elect them is 
not endorsed by all candidates. As Table 1 indicates, three of the 
four candidates in the two noncompetitive districts did not make 
group appeals. All four candidates in the competitive districts 
indicated that they sought group support.
An example of a campaign in which both candidates said they 
sought the support of groups occurred in the rural, competitive, 
Seventh district. Both candidates indicated they sought the support 
of farmers. Republican incumbent Robinson said that he could not 
be elected without their support; the first committee his organiza­
tion formed was a "Farmers for Robinson" group that engaged in mass 
mailings to other farmers. Democratic challenger Williams' campaign 
literature stressed that he was a cattle farmer and understood and 
cared about the problems of the farmer. Both courted the elderly:
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TABLE 1
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT 
COMPETITIVENESS AND USE OF GROUP APPEALS
(N = 8a)
District
Competi­ Noncompe­
Appeal tive titive
Num- Per Num- Per
ber cent ber cent
:ndidates using group appeals
oot-l ]_( 25)
mdidates not using group appeals
oo 3 ( 75)
Total 4(100) 4 (100)
Q
Two candidates in each of four districts.
Robinson by holding a special, well publicized, "Conference for Retired 
People," and Williams by making an issue of the fact that Robinson 
had voted against the bill to give Social Security recipients a 
20 per cent increase in benefits. Williams consistently stressed that 
issue both in speeches and his campaign literature. Robinson attempted 
to combine these two groups with the support that he had from various 
business organizations. He was given the National Association of 
Businessmen's "Watchdog of the Treasury" award. Williams sought to 
add the youth vote, especially students, to his coalition.
Both candidates in the noncompetitive First district indicated 
that they avoided appeals to groups. The incumbent, Democrat Downing, 
said he sought broad-based support and made no efforts to acquire the 
votes of special groups. Perhaps the best example of this unwilling­
ness to seek group support was stated by the challenger, Republican 
Wells:
I'm not making any appeals to ethnic groups or any other types 
of groups, in my estimation groups shouldn't be treated differently 
or given special treatment. I have even turned down money from 
groups who I thought would want favors in the future.
Thus, there would appear to be a tendency for candidates in 
close races to actively seek the support of groups, perhaps because 
of the closeness of the race they feel that they have to resort to 
every tactic available. For example, this was the explanation 
offered by Democratic challenger Miller in the competitive Tenth 
district: "X court the support of these various groups for a very
simple reason. I need all the manpower, money, and publicity I can 
get. And, of course, their votes."
B . Area Concentration
One of the rules of rational campaigning is that candidates 
should concentrate on areas in which they are thought to be strongest. 
So candidates were asked whether they concentrated on voters in areas 
where they thought they were strong or where they thought they were 
weak. (See Appendix B.) As shown in Table 2, all the candidates in 
competitive districts said they concentrated on areas of strength, 
whereas the opposite is true of candidates in noncompetitive races. 
Thus, there appears to be a strong relationship betx/een inter-party
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TABLE 2
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT 
COMPETITIVENESS AND TYPE OF AREA 
CONCENTRATION
(N = 8a)
District
Concentration
Competi­
tive
Num- Per 
ber cent
Noncompe­
titive
Num- Per 
ber cent
Candidates concentrating in strong
areas
4(100) 0<i°0)
Candidates concentrating in weak
areas o< 0) 4 < °>
Total 4 (100) 4 (100)
Two candidates in each of four districts.
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competition and this "rale" of campaigning. The best explanation is 
probably that offered by Kingdon: sure winners are able to experiment
because of their safe position and sure losers likely felt they had to 
concentrate in weaker areas to have any hope of broadening their 
support enough to win.^ On the other hand, candidates in races 
where the outcome is less certain tended toward strategies that were 
designed to reinforce strong areas.
Robinson's campaign director, Bill Lee, gave the following 
explanation for his decision to stress strong areas:
We feel that we're just wasting our resources in going into 
some areas. I'm confident we can win if we can just make all of 
the people who are inclined to think like us aware of our campaign 
and then get them to vote.
Another view was expressed by the Treasurer of Wells' campaign, Larry
Selman, who seemed not to be aware of this particular strategic point.
He said, "We intend to concentrate most of our efforts right at the
heart of Mr. Downing's strength." Both Wells and Selman were involved
in their first political campaign.
C . Issue Appeals
As mentioned in Chapter II, candidate discussion of policy 
and constituency issues rather than ideological and personal issues 
was considered most effective in winning votes. To discover what issues 
were discussed, the candidates were asked two questions: which issues
have you "considered most important for your election chances," and
61John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 121.
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which issues have been "most harmful, to your campaign." (See Appendix 
A.) The number of issues mentioned by each candidate ran from as few 
as four to as many as eight. From their responses, we can determine 
the saliency of the issues to each of the candidates.
The issues were grouped into four categories: policy issues,
ideological issues, constituency issues, and personal issues. The
method used to classify the issues is the same as used by Huckshorn
and Spencer in their study of the 1962 Congressional campaign: a
policy issue emphasizes factual information, a candidate’s view on
a specific area of public policy, and usually involves some potential
or actual gain for some group or person; an ideological issue does
not emphasize factual information, is largely of a philosophical
nature, tends to simplify complex issues, and yields easily to passion,
stereotype and sloganeering; a constituency issue is a service issue,
involves case work, or a particular candidate can "do more for you” in
terms of solving individual constituent problems; a personal issue
deals with character allegations, specific to the age, personal
characteristics, personal associations, and occupation of the 
62opponent.
A distinction may be made among the four types of issues such 
that a single subject area might fall into more than one category. 
Constituency and personal issues are obviously different subject types, 
but policy and ideological issues must be considered in the context
6 2
Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, The Politics of 
Defeat (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press,
1971) pp. 197-2.08.
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of how the issue is discussed. For example, the challenger in the 
First district, Wells, spoke of the issue of crime in terms of the 
"moral decay of our nation" (ideological), whereas the challenger 
in the Tenth district, Miller, addressed the same issue by 
emphasizing that he favored increased spending for additional police­
men, better police pension plans and increased salaries for policemen 
(policy).
The results, as shown in Table 3, indicate that there would 
seem to be a relationship between inter-party competition and candidate 
choice of policy or ideological issues. A total of fourteen issues were 
mentioned in the competitive races; fourteen were also mentioned in the 
noncompetitive races. Candidates in competitive districts emphasized 
policy issues over ideological ones by a margin of six-to-one; candi­
dates in noncompetitive districts chose ideological issues by nearly 
two-to-one. The most ideological oriented campaign was that of Wells 
in the noncompetitive First district. A newspaper report said that
Wells offered the voters an . . applie pie, motherhood and the
6 3flag campaign." Wells said that he wanted his campaign to 
". . . project a program of constitutional government, fiscal
responsibility and patriotic dedication to country." He appealed 
to the ". . . patriotic and religious instincts of Americans."
As Table 4 indicates, there does not seem to be a significant 
association between party competition and candidate choice of personal
The Richmond Tlmes-Dispatch [ Richmond, Virginia ], 
October 1.0, 1972, Sec. B, p. 4.
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TABLE 3
ISSUE EMPHASIS AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION: 
POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES IN 
COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE 
DISTRICTS
(N = 28)
Issue
District
Competi- Noncompe- 
tive titive
Num- Per Num- Per 
ber cent ber cent
Policy issues emphasized 12< 85.7) 5( 35.5)
Ideological issues emphasized 2( 14.3) 9( 64.5)
Total
14(100.0) 14(ioo.o)
37
TABLE 4
ISSUE EMPHASIS AND INTER-PARTY COMPETITION: 
CONSTITUENCY AND PERSONAL ISSUES IN 
COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE 
DISTRICTS
(N = 18)
District
Issue
Competi­
tive
Num- Per 
ber cent
Noncompe­
titive
Num- Per 
ber cent
Constituency issues emphasized 4< 50) 4 ( 40)
Personal issues emphasized 4 < 5 0 > 6( 60)
Total
oo1—
I 00
ooI—
Ior—
1
or constituency issues. In fact, the campaign with the most emphasis
on the personality of the candidate and the most name-calling was in
the competitive Tenth district. Incumbent Republican Broyhill seldom
referred to his opponent, Miller, but when he did it was in terms
64
of "some demagogue or hypocrite." Broyhill referred to Senator 
Edward Kennedy as "Chappaquiddick T e d d y . K e n n e d y  had endorsed
64
The Washington Post [ Washington, D. C. ], October 20, 1972, 
Sec. B , p . 1.
^Ibid . , p . 7 .
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Miller during the campaign and helped raise funds for the challenger. 
Miller cited the number one issue in the campaign as Broyhill's many 
"personal conflicts of interest."
The factor of incumbency does appear to be associated with 
these issues: incumbents emphasized 75 per cent of the constituency
issues in both competitive and noncompetitive races; nonincumbents 
chose 70 per cent of the personal issues. Incumbents appeared to 
choose a strategy designed to make themselves appear to be above 
the partisan battle. They avoided personal attacks on their 
opponents (usually ignoring them) and stressed their efforts at 
constituent service.
D . Personal Contact
The amount of personal contact a candidate engages in is an 
important aspect of his campaign strategy. Most candidates believe 
that the more personal his communication with voters, the more effective 
he is likely to be.
One way of measuring how much personal contact candidates have 
with the electorate is to determine how many days they actually 
spent campaigning.^ Candidates in competitive districts tended to 
campaign more than those in noncompetitive districts as Table 5 
indicates. They averaged 86 days campaigning; noncompetitive candi­
dates averaged 61 days. Incumbents averaged 39 days and nonincumbents, 
104 days. Much of this difference between incumbents and nonincumbents
David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 103.
39
is due to the length of the Congressional session, which kept incum­
bents in Washington until the middle of October. Also, to determine 
the amount of personal contact, campaign aides were asked to estimate 
how many times their candidate appeared before any sort of organized 
gathering of voters. Here, again, competitive candidates engaged in 
more personal contact as Table 6 indicates.
E . Theme
As indicated in Chapter II, a short and easily recognizable 
theme is an important part of a political campaign. By reading 
campaign literature and by interviewing campaign aides, one was 
able to determine if each campaign had a short, recognizable campaign 
theme. As Table 7 indicates, all the candidates in competitive 
districts had a discernible theme. The two who did not in the 
noncompetitive districts were both nonincumbents. Good examples 
of short themes were the Broyhill and Downing themes. The Broyhill 
theme, "Twenty Years of Effective Leadership,” was designed to 
capitalize on the candidate's vast experience and record of service 
to his constituents. The Downing theme, "This Man Is Your Man," was 
also designed to capitalize on the fact that Downing had spent 
fourteen years as the First district's "man in Washington."
It is interesting also that when asked if they thought 
having a theme is of any importance in political campaigning, all 
four candidates in competitive races said yes. Of the four in 
noncompetitive races, three answered negatively or said that they felt 
that its importance was overrated by professional political managers.
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS SPENT CAMPAIGNING 
BY CANDIDATES IN COMPETITIVE AND 
NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS
District
Days Campaigning
Compe- Noncom- 
titive petitive
Average days per candidate 86 61
TABLE 6
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCES BY 
CANDIDATES IN COMPETITIVE AND 
NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS
District
Personal Appearances
Compe- Noncom- 
titive petitive
Average days per candidate 55 30
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TABLE 7
A CLASSIFICATION OF CANDIDATES BY DISTRICT 
COMPETITIVENESS AND TYPE OF THEME USED
(N = 8a)
District
Theme
Competi­
tive
Num- Per
ber cent
Noncompe­
titive
Num- Per 
ber cent
Candidates using short, discernible
theme
oor—1 2< 50)
Candidates using no discernible
theme 0< °> 2( 50)
Total 4 (100) 4 (100)
g
Two candidates in each of four districts.
Thus, there seems to be a tendency for candidates in competitive races 
both to have themes and to acknowledge their importance.
F . Party-Personality
One of the longstanding rules of campaign strategy is that 
candidates from the majority party should emphasize their party label
and play down their personal characteristics. The reverse is true of
candidates from the minority party.
To determine if this rule was followed, candidates were asked
whether they emphasized their personal characteristics or their par 
affiliation during the campaign. (See Appendix A.) All eight 
candidates responded that they stressed their own personal 
attributes over their party. Also, the four Democrats indicated 
that they were not anxious to have themselves linked to the 
national McGovern-Shriver ticket, which they preceived as being 
unpopular in Virginia in 1972. In this setting, there was no 
relationship between inter-party competition and this particular 
element of campaign strategy.
There is evidence that the American electorate has 
grown distrustful of their political parties and may be 
losing their habit of partisanship.8  ^ A survey by M. Johnson 
and Broder in 1970 indicated that ". . . not only are voters
splitting their tickets and moving back and forth from election to 
election, but their perception of party differences is growing 
visibly w e a k e r . I f  this trend continues, perhaps the most 
"rational" course for a candidate to follow is to deemphasize his 
party affiliation even if he is from the majority party.
G • V o r Turnout
Another rule of good campaigning is that nonincumbents, 
the challengers, should make a determined effort to increase voter 
turnout. A recent study of registration and voting has indicated
6 7David S. Broder, The Party's Over (New York: Harper
and Row, 1972), p. 251. 
68Ibid.
that there is a very close relationship between the number of people
69
registered to vote and the actual voter turnout on election day.
The relationship was almost one to one: if City A had 1 per cent
higher registration than City B, then voter turnout on the average 
was 1 per cent higher in City A . ^  Therefore, one way to determine 
if a candidate seriously attempts to increase turnout is to see how 
much emphasis he placed on registration. The four nonincumbents 
were asked how much emphasis they placed on registration drives: 
considerable, fair amount, or none. (See Appendix A.) The candi­
dates in competitive races answered considerable; the noncompetitive 
candidate replied none. The reason cited by both sure losers for 
their nonemphasis was that they lacked the money and the organiza­
tion to do so. The challenger in the competitive Tenth district, 
Miller, placed the most emphasis on increasing voter turnout, 
especially young voters. He had representatives on every major 
college campus in the state, whose job was to get students from the 
Tenth district properly registered so they could vote by absentee 
ballot. He indicated that his campaign ’’dedicated the entire month o 
September to getting people registered.” Thus, there would seem to 
be an association between challengers ’ efforts to increase voter 
turnout and inter-party competition (see Table 8).
69Stanley Kelley, 
’’Registration and Voting: 
Political Science Review,
Richard Ayres, and William Bowen, 
Putting First Things First,” American 
June, 1967, p. 362.
70Ibid .
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TABLE 8
A CLASSIFICATION OF CHALLENGERS BY DISTRICT 
COMPETITIVENESS AND AMOUNT OF EMPHASIS 
ON TURNOUT
(N = 4a)
Emphasis on Turnout
District
Competi- Noncompe- 
tive titive
Num- Per Num- Per 
ber cent ber cent
Candidates with considerable 
emphasis on turnout 2(100) 0( 0)
Candidates with a fair amount 
of emphasis on turnout
OO
o o
Candidates with no emphasis on 
turnout
rvOV/O 2 (100)
Total 2(100) 2(100)
aOne candidate in each of four districts.
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H. Summary
Nearly all the elements of a "rational" campaign strategy 
appear to be associated with the variable of inter-party competition. 
The questions of group appeals, area concentration, issue appeals 
(policy-ideological), personal contact, theme, and turnout are related 
to inter-party competition. Only the questions of party-personality 
and candidate choice of personal or constituency issues do not seem 
to be related to party competition. In the concluding chapter, 
there is a summary of the results and a look at the possible implica­
tions of the findings of this investigation.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this investigation has been to observe the 
association between inter-party competition and the campaign strategies 
employed by various Congressional candidates. Both of these variables 
are important elements in the American political process. In fact, 
as previously mentioned, the factor of competition can be considered 
essential for democracy. And, the amount of real competition in 
election campaigns is n. . . an important measure of the meaning­
fulness of any democracy."^
The campaigns in four Congressional districts in Virginia 
were observed during the 1972 election campaign. Two of the 
districts were competitive and two were noncompetitive. Most of 
the data for the study came from direct interviews with the eight 
candidates in the four races. Campaign aides and one newsman from 
each district were also questioned. Thus, the study is limited 
because of the number of campaigns that were observed. Also, the
results may be applicable only to areas such as Virginia where party
72politics have been in a state of flux in recent years.
David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 1.
72J. Harvie Willcenson, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of 
Virginia Politics 1945-1966 (Charlottesville, Virginia: University
Press of Virginia, 1968).
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The hypothesis of the study is that candidates in competitive 
races conduct more "rational" campaign strategies than their counter­
parts in noncompetitive races. A strategy is considered "rational" 
if the candidate: makes group appeals; emphasizes policy and
constituency issues rather than ideological and personal ones; 
concentrates his time and efforts in areas of strength rather than 
weakness; engages in as much personal contact as possible; employs a 
simple, recognizable campaign theme; emphasizes his party affiliation 
if from the majority party and emphasizes his personal characteristics 
if from the minority party; and attempts to increase the voter turnout 
if a nonincumbent. The results of this investigation confirmed the 
hypothesis. Candidates in competitive races did conduct, for the 
most part, more "rational" strategies; only the questions of 
party or personality emphasis and candidate choice of personal or 
constituency issues do not seem to be related with inter-party 
competition.
There appears to be a reasonable explanation for the fact 
that all the candidates chose to emphasize their personal characteris­
tics over their party affiliation. As previously stated, recent
evidence indicates that the American electorate is steadily losing
73
its habit of partisanship. Also, the two major parties have not 
exhibited that much strength in Virginia elections in recent years; 
independents won the state-wide races in both 1970 and 1971. Both
73David S. Broder, The Party's Over (New York: Harper
and Row, 1972), p. 251.
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times they defeated candidates from the two major parties. Thus, it 
seems that candidates have deemed it more "rational" not to emphasize 
their party affiliation even if their party is in the majority.
Also, there was no important relationship between party 
competition and candidate choice of constituency or personal issues. 
Incumbents emphasized most of the constituency issues; nonincumbents 
most of the personal issues. It is logical for incumbents, who 
have a record of constituent service, to stress their previous 
service. Perhaps, however, it is incorrect to state that nonincumbents 
to be "rational" also have to emphasize constituency issues: they
have no previous service and to bring this to the attention of the 
voter only aids the incumbent. It may be that nonincumbents are 
forced to use personal issues to get recognition both from the media 
and the electorate and therefore find it more useful to emphasize 
personal issues rather than constituency issues.
Candidates in competitive races sought the support of groups 
among the electorate and also concentrated their campaign activities 
in areas of perceived strength. Candidates in noncompetitive races 
did not adhere to these two strategic rules of campaigning. Campaigns 
in noncompetitive races were more ideologically oriented than those 
in competitive races. Candidates in competitive districts stressed 
policy issues; candidates in noncompetitive districts emphasized 
ideological issues. Candidates in noncompetitive races were also 
less likely to follow some of the other points that Froman considered
49
74in a realistic campaign strategy. They engaged in less personal
contact; were more likely not to have a campaign theme; and if a
nonincumbent, made less of an effort to enlarge the turnout.
Therefore, at least in the campaigns studied, competition tended to
be related to rationality in decision making by candidates. Kingdon
also found that candidates in noncompetitive races adopted ". . .
75plans that are less than efficient for gaining support." The
explanation may be that sure winners, confident of victory, do not
attempt to simply add to their support but also attempt to engage
in a campaign to "educate" others. On the other hand, the sure
losers, fairly certain of their defeat, may decide to "speak their
76
minds” instead of trying to broaden their base of support.
Besides rationality in decision making, there would seem
to be other beneficial aspects of campaigning in competitive districts
With candidate emphasis on policy issues and not ideological issues,
campaigns in competitive districts are . . perhaps the ideal in
77popular concept of the democratic electoral process." By exchanging 
views on specific areas of public policy, candidates are engaged in a
74Lewis Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies 
and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, ed. by Kent Jennings and 
Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, Hew Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1966), pp. 12, 16.
75John Kingdon, Candidates for Office (New York: Random
House, 1968), p. 133.
76Ibid.
77Robert Huckshorn and Robert Spencer, The Politics of 
Defeat (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1971), p. 197.
very desirable method of informing the electorate. In fact, representa­
tive democracy may be defined in terms of the access of voters to 
issues of public policy, how these issues are discussed and the choices 
that are provided among the candidates. Also, there is evidence that
candidates in competitive races are more accurately informed about
78voter opinions than candidates in noncompetitive races. It is more
likely, then, that their Congressional votes and actions will be more
representative than the votes and actions of candidates from non-
79competitive districts.
The importance of competition is also indicated by the 
evidence gathered concerning political participation, a concept 
frequently used to measure the usefulness of democracy. Candidates 
in competitive races made a much greater effort to increase voter 
turnout. They spent money and considerable time in efforts to 
register new voters. They also engaged in a great deal more personal 
contact than candidates in noncompetitive races. They campaigned 
an average of twenty-five more days and also made nearly twice as 
many personal appearances as noncompetitive candidates. Thus, voters 
in competitive districts were more likely to be visited by a candidate 
or hear a campaign speech and therefore, at least to that extent, be 
involved in the political process.
In addition, it may be that competitive candidates by using 
short campaign themes serve an educational function. Most voters do
78Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy, p. 60. 
79Ibid.
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have only a short attention span and limited retention; therefore, it
is likely that brief, easily recognizable campaign themes are useful
in that they make it easier for those voters to understand the
political debate.
Evidence has mounted recently that perhaps the amount of
party competition is not as essential to democracy as previously 
80
was believed. For example, a study of welfare politics indicated
that welfare payments were not related to party competition as much
as they were related to other factors such as per capita income
. ,, 81and various other economic variables.
However, this study does not reach the same conclusion as
these recent investigations have. The findings of this investigation
indicate that increased party competition is associated with variables
considered important to democracy. Rationality in candidate decision
increased as the amount of party competition increased. As competition
increased, so did the amount of political participation, a concept
82that can be used to measure the usefulness of democracy. Candidates
in competitive districts engaged in a more meaningful discussion of
83issues, also considered ideal for democracy. Candidates in
80
Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: 
Rand McNally and Company, 1966).
81Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, 
Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States," The 
Journal of Politics, XXV (May, 1963), 265-89.
82Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy, p. 120.
83Huckshorn and Spencer, The Politics of Defeat, p. 197.
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competitive races also made greater efforts to educate the electorate. 
Thus, the results of this investigation seriously question the 
conclusion reached by various scholars in recent years that increased 
party competition is not essential to democracy.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
CANDIDATE QUESTIONNAIRE
1. When you began your campaign, how certain were you of the eventual 
election outcome?
2. Why did you feel this way?
3. During your campaign, is there any group or groups of voters that 
you especially make an appeal to?
a. If yes, which ones?
b. If no, what is your overall campaign plan?
4. How have you attempted to win their support?
5. Have any groups endorsed your candidacy?
6. How important do you think these groups are in terms of your 
election chances?
7. Do you concentrate your efforts on voters in areas where you 
think you will do well, or where you think you'll run poorly, or 
what ?
8. Since you began your campaign, how many days have you spent 
actually campaigning in your district?
a. How important is it that candidates get out and mix with 
the people?
9. How much emphasis have you placed on registration drives?
a. Considerable.
b. A fair amount.
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c. None.
10. Would a large turnout aid you or your opponent? 
a. Why?
11. Do you think your campaign has developed any particular theme? 
a. If so, what?
12. Do you feel that having a theme is of any importance in a 
political campaign?
13. Which of the following three factors would you say is most 
important in determining the choice of the voters?
a. Party label.
b. Issues of the campaign.
c. Personal characteristics of the candidates.
14. Which have you emphasized most?
15. Turning to issues, which ones have you considered most important 
for your election chances?
16. Why have these been so important?
17. Which ones have been most harmful to your campaign?
18. How have you presented your i.ssues--did you deal generally with 
them or did you treat them in a more detailed fashion?
19. Do you think your method of presentation has had any effect on 
your election chances?
20. How important is it to you that you be elected, or are there 
other considerations that enter into your choices?
21. Finally, is there anything else about your campaign that you would 
like to add?
APPENDIX B
LIST OF CANDIDATES INTERVIEWED
District
Tenth
Seventh
Second
First
Incumbent
Joel Broyhill 
Republican
J. Kenneth Robinson 
Republican
William Whitehurst 
Republican
Thomas Downing 
Democrat
Challenger
Harold Miller 
Democrat
Murat Williams 
Democrat
Charles Burlage 
Democrat
Kenneth WTells 
Republican
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APPENDIX C
INDEX OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION
As mentioned in Chapter III, the method used to determine this
84index is the one suggested by David. The election results from the
last ten years for the offices of Governor, Senator, and Congressman
in the four districts were compiled to determine the runner-up party's
percentage of one-half the total vote. This resulted in a scale
ranging from 0 to 100; the higher the ranking, the greater the level
of competition. It was felt that if a district ranked 80 or better
(the runner-up party averaged over 40 per cent of the vote), it would
be considered competitive. Leuthold, in his analysis of Congressional
campaigns in California, also considered candidates who received 40-
85
to 60-per cent of the vote to be in competitive races. Also, 
incumbents falling in this range are frequently targets for special 
efforts by opponents because of the margin of their previous 
victory.^ This increases the likelihood that the campaigns will 
be competitive. The results of the index are shown in Table 9.
84Paul David, "How Can an Index of Party Competition Best be 
Derived?" Journal of Politics, XXXIV (May, 1972), 632-38.
85David Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 4.
^Movement for a New Congress, Vote Power: The Official
Activist Campaigner's Handbook (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hali, Inc., 1970).
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TABLE 9
THE RESULTS OF THE INDEX OF INTER-PARTY 
COMPETITION
District
Runner-up's Percentage of One- 
half the Total of both Votes
Competition
Con­
gress­
man
Sen­
ator
Gover­
nor
Aver­
age
Tenth 88.6 64.6 96.8 83.3 Competitive
Seventh 89.2 62.2 98.4 83.2 Competitive
Second 53.8 58.2 88.2 73.4 Noncompetitive
First 28.6 56.4 91.4 58.7 Noncompetitive
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